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dc.contributor.advisorHarvey Sapolsky.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHorst, Adam Marshall, 1978-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-10-14T20:32:57Z
dc.date.available2005-10-14T20:32:57Z
dc.date.copyright2004en_US
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29437
dc.descriptionThesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2004.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (p. 97-102).en_US
dc.description.abstractI examine America's reputation for sustaining casualties (i.e., foreign perceptions of American casualty sensitivity) in order to test and shed light on the larger "reputation" hypothesis. For the purposes of this paper, the reputation hypothesis posits that foreign perceptions of American casualty tolerance are based on past American actions. The central question of this paper asks how countries come to hold their perceptions of American casualty sensitivity. I conduct six case studies to test four (not mutually exclusive) hypotheses - reputation, interests, democracy, and culture - concerning foreign perceptions of American casualty sensitivity. The case studies document foreign leaders - including adversaries, allies, and neutrals - giving the United States reputations for lacking resolve and being unable to sustain casualties based upon America's previous retreats and defeats. I conclude that, in disagreement with the central conclusions of the reputation literature to date, it is indeed right for a state to fight for its reputation. In addition, the evidence suggests that the reputation hypothesis, democracy hypothesis, and culture hypothesis explain different aspects of the phenomenon. However, when viewed in combination, these three hypotheses provide a nearly complete explanation of how countries come to hold their perceptions of American casualty sensitivity. Surprisingly, the historical record provides the least amount of support for the interests hypothesis.en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) These foreign perceptions of American casualty sensitivity hurt the ability of the United States to deter adversaries from making challenges against U.S. interests and to compel adversaries to back down once conflicts have broken out. Therefore, American leaders should understand that there are reputational costs and/or benefits associated with their foreign policy statements and actions.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Adam Marshall Horst.en_US
dc.format.extent102 p.en_US
dc.format.extent4393651 bytes
dc.format.extent4393457 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectPolitical Science.en_US
dc.titleForeign perceptions of American casualty sensitivity : is your reputation worth fighting for?en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
dc.identifier.oclc56191626en_US


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