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dc.contributor.authorSmith, James Lee
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-05T17:32:19Z
dc.date.available2006-06-05T17:32:19Z
dc.date.issued1980-04
dc.identifier.other06684288
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/32990
dc.description.abstractPrevious authors have noted a curious result that arises in the context of sealed-bid auctions: in certain situations it is in the bidder's interest to respond non-aggressively to increased competition. We consider a decision-theoretic formulation of the bidder's problem, and derive necessary conditions for the choice of a non-aggressive bidding strategy. The resulting conditions relate closely to a phenomenon that has been described rather loosely by bidding practitioners as the "winner's curse". In the course of this paper we develop a specific definition of the winner's curse, and demonstrate how it affects the firm's competitive behavior.en
dc.format.extent728304 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherMIT Energy Laboratoryen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMIT-ELen
dc.relation.ispartofseries80-013wpen
dc.subjectLetting of contractsen
dc.titleNon-aggressive bidding behavior and the "winner's curse"en
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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