dc.contributor.author | Smith, James Lee | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-06-05T17:32:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-06-05T17:32:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1980-04 | |
dc.identifier.other | 06684288 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/32990 | |
dc.description.abstract | Previous authors have noted a curious result that arises in the
context of sealed-bid auctions: in certain situations it is in
the bidder's interest to respond non-aggressively to increased
competition. We consider a decision-theoretic formulation of the
bidder's problem, and derive necessary conditions for the choice
of a non-aggressive bidding strategy. The resulting conditions
relate closely to a phenomenon that has been described rather
loosely by bidding practitioners as the "winner's curse". In the
course of this paper we develop a specific definition of the winner's
curse, and demonstrate how it affects the firm's competitive
behavior. | en |
dc.format.extent | 728304 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.publisher | MIT Energy Laboratory | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | MIT-EL | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 80-013wp | en |
dc.subject | Letting of contracts | en |
dc.title | Non-aggressive bidding behavior and the "winner's curse" | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |