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dc.contributor.advisorDaron Acemoglu and Dora L. Costa.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGallego, Francisco Aen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-11-07T12:35:49Z
dc.date.available2006-11-07T12:35:49Z
dc.date.copyright2006en_US
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/34504
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation consists of four essays on human capital, institutions, and incentives. In the first essay, I investigate the effects of voucher-school competition on educational outcomes in Chile. I present a theoretical model that produces three empirical predictions: voucher-school competition 1) improves student outcomes; 2) may put stronger pressure on public schools to increase quality; and 3) has weaker effects when public school budget constraints are softer. I exploit the interaction of the number of Catholic priests and the institution of the voucher system as a potentially exogenous determinant of voucher school entry. Using this instrument, I confirm the main predictions of my theoretical model. In the second essay, I show that cross-country differences in schooling persist to the present because colonial factors influence the extent of institutional variables, such as democracy and political decentralization. By using the number of native cultures before colonization as an instrument for political decentralization, I show that the degree of democratization positively affects the development of primary education, whereas political decentralization is the more important explanation for differences in higher levels of schooling.en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) In the third essay, coauthored with Robert Woodberry, we show that competition between Protestant and Catholic missionaries increased schooling in former colonies. Our evidence implies that Protestant missionaries increased schooling in Catholic countries, and that the impact of Protestant and Catholic missionaries on educational outcomes was similar when missionaries of both denominations faced the same legal and institutional treatment. We interpret these results in the context of an economic rationale in which different institutions created differences in competitive pressures faced by Catholic and Protestant missionaries. Finally, in the fourth essay, I investigate the evolution of the skill premium in Chile over the last decades. I present evidence that patterns of skill upgrading in Chile have followed the evolution of the same variable in the US, consistent with a model of endogenous technological choice where new technologies are produced in developed countries and adopted in developing economies.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Francisco A. Gallego.en_US
dc.format.extent198 p.en_US
dc.format.extent10687838 bytes
dc.format.extent10696174 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectEconomics.en_US
dc.titleHuman capital, institutions, and incentives : micro and macro perspectivesen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
dc.identifier.oclc70879934en_US


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