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dc.contributor.advisorOlivier J. Blanchard and Ricardo J. Caballero.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBennett, Herman Zen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-03T15:37:09Z
dc.date.available2007-08-03T15:37:09Z
dc.date.copyright2006en_US
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/34506en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/34506
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation consists of three essays. The first one studies the effect of labor policy, in particular of firing costs, on financially restricted firms. It proposes and models an effect of firing costs that has not been described in the literature so far. When a time gap exists between production and its associated revenues, firing can become a liquidity adjustment tool that allows firms to increase their short-term liquidity. The presence of firing costs reduces the ability of firms to use this tool. This reduction negatively affects the optimal levels of investment and production of financially restricted firms. I present empirical evidence in line with this effect. The second essay studies the empirical relationship between aggregate macroeconomic volatility and idiosyncratic firm-level volatility. This relationship is a testable implication of a rich set of theoretical models available in the literature. I propose a consistent estimator of the variance of firms' real sales growth rate (proxy for idiosyncratic volatility) based on the cross-sectional properties of firms' distribution. I use optimal structural break tests and long-run relationship tests to study the relationship between aggregate and idiosyncratic firm-level volatility. The main empirical results suggest a negative and significant long-run relationship.en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) The third essay, coauthored with Norman Loayza, analyzes potential monetary and fiscal policy biases that could result from the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities-in a macro-policy environment where the monetary authority is committed to independently controlling inflation. We show that an increase in the divergence of authorities' preferences, with respect to the short-run trade-off between output and inflation gap, could lead to higher fiscal deficits and higher interest rates. We use a game-theoretic model to analyze this interaction, and we present supporting empirical evidence based on a panel data estimation for industrial countries.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Herman Z. Bennett.en_US
dc.format.extent109 p.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/34506en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectEconomics.en_US
dc.titleEssays in macroeconomicsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
dc.identifier.oclc70889212en_US


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