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dc.contributorCarlén, Björn.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2003-10-24T14:55:35Z
dc.date.available2003-10-24T14:55:35Z
dc.date.issued2002-11en_US
dc.identifier.otherno. 91en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a91en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3553
dc.descriptionAbstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Website. (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/)en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (p. 18-19).en_US
dc.description.abstractThe experiment reported here tests the case of so-called exclusionary manipulation of emission permit markets, i.e., when a dominant firm -- here a monopolist -- increases its holding of permits in order to raise its rivals' costs and thereby gain more on a product market. Earlier studies have claimed that this type of market manipulation is likely to substantially reduce the social gains of permit trading and even result in negative gains. The experiment designed here parallels institutional and informat ional conditions likely to hold in real trade with carbon permits among electricity producers. Although the dominant firm withheld supply from the electricity market, the outcome seems to reject the theory of exclusionary manipulation. In later trading p eriods, closing prices on both markets, permit holdings and total electricity production are near competitive levels. Social gains of emissions trading are higher than in earlier studies.en_US
dc.format.extent31 p.en_US
dc.format.extent663803 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Changeen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesReport no. 91en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a91en_US
dc.subject.lccQC981.8.C5.M58 no.91en_US
dc.titleExclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets: a laboratory testen_US


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