Border fixity : when good fences make bad neighbors

Abstract

Since the end of the Second World War, a norm of "border fixity" - a proscription of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory - has become prevalent in world politics. Such practices are no longer acceptable tools of policy. Has the international norm of border fixity made international conflict less frequent? Since research has established that territorial issues have been among the major causes of war, many observers might assume that the norm of "border fixity" has made war less common. This dissertation argues that the opposite conclusion is true as far as socio-politically weak states - states that do not possess a reasonable level of legitimate and effective governmental institutions - are involved. In a world in which it is illegitimate to change international borders by force, and in which socio-politically weak states are widespread, international conflict and instability may actually be more common. The border fixity norm, moreover, perpetuates and exacerbates the weakness of already weak states thus making a significant decrease in conflicts unlikely. This dissertation examines the question of the effects of the international norm of border fixity by studying and comparing four cases.

(cont.) Two cases are taken from the era prior to the establishment of the border fixity norm: Brandenburg-Prussia from 1640 to 1740, and Argentina from 1810 to 1880. Two cases are taken from a world in which the norm of border fixity is present: Lebanon from 1943 to 2005, and Congo from 1960 to 2005. Despite some variations, the case studies and the comparison between them largely confirm the argument stated above: Border fixity perpetuates state weakness and, in regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, good fences often create bad neighbors.