Advanced Search
DSpace@MIT

The value of contractual terms in office leases

Research and Teaching Output of the MIT Community

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Henry O, Pollakowski. en_US
dc.contributor.author Sheehan, Kevin T. (Kevin Thomas) en_US
dc.contributor.other Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Architecture. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2007-06-27T20:27:24Z
dc.date.available 2007-06-27T20:27:24Z
dc.date.copyright 2006 en_US
dc.date.issued 2006 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/37445 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37445
dc.description Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 2006. en_US
dc.description This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections. en_US
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (leaf 41). en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper uses a comprehensive data set to develop a hedonic model of office rent that estimates values of contractual terms such as tenant improvement allowances, leasing commissions, and options. The model includes variables to control for building characteristics and market conditions, as well as basic lease terms. Although other studies have used a similar approach, the prior work in this area was limited by the lack of data regarding contractual terms. The results show that there is a consistent, upward-sloping, convex term structure of rent. Furthermore, there is an insignificant "size premium" but the "proportion discount" is significant. In general, other variables, such as location variables and qualitative variables behave as expected, with the exception of the expense type dummy variables. Tenant improvement allowances and leasing commissions paid by the landlord do not have a predictable impact on rent at low levels. But high levels of allowances and commissions result in significant rent premiums. These results indicate that lower levels of allowances and commissions may be expected by the market. At higher levels, however, these contractual terms are clearly priced into rent levels. en_US
dc.description.abstract (cont.) Renewal options appear to have positive impacts in some years and negative impacts in other years. Renewal options may represent amenities that are granted to tenants as inducements in weaker leasing markets but are priced in stronger markets. Termination options and rights of first offer/refusal appear to have negative impacts on rent that are somewhat consistent in all years. This is counterintuitive because these options are thought to benefit the tenant. One explanation is that these options are in fact beneficial to the landlord. Further study is necessary to understand the value of these options. Overall, more information about options terms would be beneficial. Information such as the renewal rent, the termination fee, and the size of the offer/refusal space would help us to understand the economic arrangement between the parties and to predict the corresponding impact on rent. en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibility by Kevin T. Sheehan. en_US
dc.format.extent 44 leaves en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology en_US
dc.rights M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. en_US
dc.rights.uri http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/37445 en_US
dc.rights.uri http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subject Architecture. en_US
dc.title The value of contractual terms in office leases en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.description.degree S.M. en_US
dc.contributor.department Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Architecture. en_US
dc.identifier.oclc 123446304 en_US


Files in this item

Name Size Format Description
123446304-MIT.pdf 206.5Kb PDF Full printable version

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

MIT-Mirage