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dc.contributor.advisorRonald L. Rivest.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHohenberger, Susan Rae, 1978-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-18T13:09:00Z
dc.date.available2007-07-18T13:09:00Z
dc.date.copyright2006en_US
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37912
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2006.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (p. 147-161).en_US
dc.description.abstractWe present new formal definitions, algorithms, and motivating applications for three natural cryptographic constructions. Our constructions are based on a special type of algebraic group called bilinear groups. 1. Re-Signatures: We present the first public key signature scheme where a semi-trusted proxy, given special information, can translate Alice's signature on a message into Bob's signature on the same message. The special information, however, allows nothing else, i.e., the proxy cannot translate from Bob to Alice, nor can it sign on behalf of either Alice or Bob. We show that a path through a graph can be cheaply authenticated using this scheme, with applications to electronic passports. 2. Re-Encryption: We present the first public key cryptosystem where a semi-trusted proxy, given special information, can translate an encryption of a message under Alice's key into an encryption of the same message under Bob's key. Again, the special information allows nothing else, i.e. the proxy cannot translate from Bob to Alice, decrypt on behalf of either Alice or Bob, or learn anything else about the message. We apply this scheme to create a new mechanism for secure distributed storage.en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) 3. Compact; E-Cash with Tracing and Bounded-Anonymity: We present an offline e-cash system where 2 coins can be stored in O(e + k) bits and withdrawn or spent in 0(f + k) time, where k is the security parameter. The best previously known schemes required at least one of these complexities to be 0(2t . k). In our system, a user's transactions are anonymous and unlinkable, unless she performs a forbidden action, such as double-spending a coin. Performing a forbidden action reveals the identity of the user, and optionally allows to trace all of her past transactions. We provide solutions without using a trusted party. We argue why features of our system are likely to be crucial to the adoption of any e-cash system.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Susan Hohenberger.en_US
dc.format.extent161 p.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectElectrical Engineering and Computer Science.en_US
dc.titleAdvances in signatures, encryption, and E-Cash from bilinear groupsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
dc.identifier.oclc133169070en_US


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