Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorSuzanne Berger.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchlefer, Jonathan Kingen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.en_US
dc.coverage.spatialn-mx---en_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-03T18:43:45Z
dc.date.available2007-08-03T18:43:45Z
dc.date.copyright2003en_US
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/38442
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2003.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (p. 193-203).en_US
dc.description.abstractEconomic crises are such powerful socioeconomic disasters that, not surprisingly, they are usually explained by powerful socioeconomic pressures, such as global financial speculation, structural economic failure, or populist demands. This thesis, in contrast, identifies the crucial role of elite politics. From the 1950s through the 1980s politics inside a tiny circle of high Mexican officials made the difference between economic crisis (when the exchange rate crashes) and stability. In the 1950s and 1960s, competing grupos, or cliques, within the ruling party abided by a "cooperative" system. The grupo whose leader won the internal contest for presidential nomination, hence automatically won the election, would do better, but losing grupos retained important posts. Such assurance of political survival allowed elites to defend the political system's long-run interests, not just their narrow self-interests, and avoid economic crises. In the 1970s and 1980s, "struggle" emerged as power conflicts became all-or-nothing, erupting in massive expenditures, other economic gambles, and crises. Public spending soared in pre-election years (27 percent in 1975, 22 percent in 1981), when grupos vied to build support for their leader's presidential nomination. Slashing it in the actual election years (0 growth in 1976, 8 percent decline in 1982, excluding debt payments) was too late to avert economic crisis. Most studies of economic crises in developing nations focus on what went wrong - and find too many possibilities. By scrutinizing Mexico's economic stability in the 1950s and 1960s (when nations such as Brazil and Argentina suffered repeated crises), this thesis is better able to discover the critical characteristics of political success that later eroded.en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) The relationship between state and society did not change; the system of elite politics did. Many interviews with high officials reveal how this system worked, and illuminate important facets of Mexican economic history. The more general lesson is that politics at the heart of the state is not just a small replica of society. While external constituencies endure, elite factions survive or die politically. How they handle mutual conflicts can have momentous effects on a nation.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Jonathan King Schlefer.en_US
dc.format.extent203 p.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectPolitical Science.en_US
dc.titleFractured elites : the politics of economic crisis in Mexicoen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
dc.identifier.oclc52715564en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record