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dc.contributor.advisorKenneth A. Oye.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFelbab-Brown, Vandaen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-29T20:33:12Z
dc.date.available2007-08-29T20:33:12Z
dc.date.copyright2006en_US
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/38600
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, February 2007.en_US
dc.descriptionPage 642 blank.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 575-641).en_US
dc.description.abstractThe study explores the nexus between illicit economies and military conflicts. It investigates when and how access by belligerents to the production and trafficking of illicit substances affects the strength of belligerents and governments. Although narcotics trafficking is often treated as sui generis, the study situates the drug trade within the larger class of markets for illicit products and services. The study presents a general theory of the relationship between illicit markets and military conflict - the political capital of illicit economies -- and contrasts it with conventional wisdom on connections between drug trafficking and military conflict. The political capital of illicit economies argues that belligerents derive much more than simply large financial profits from their sponsorship of illicit economies. They also obtain freedom of action and, crucially, legitimacy and support from the local population, called political capital. If belligerents choose to become negatively involved in the illicit economy (attempt to destroy it), they not only fail to increase their military capabilities, but also suffer costs in terms of political capital. The extent and scope of belligerents' gains/ losses from their involvement in the illicit economy depend on four factors:en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) the state of the overall economy; the character of the illicit economy; the presence of traffickers; and the government response to the illicit economy. These factors reflect both structural conditions outside of the immediate control of the belligerents and the government and strategic policy choices available to either the belligerents or the government. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about narcotics and military conflict, eradication of narcotics cultivation has dubious effects on the capabilities of the belligerents and is extremely unlikely to severely weaken them. However, it alienates the local population from the government and results in the population's unwillingness to provide intelligence on the belligerents - a crucial requirement for success against the belligerents. Thus, eradication of illicit crops increases the political capital of the belligerents without significantly weakening their military capabilities. The primary cases explored in the study are Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan. Additional evidence is drawn from the cases of Burma, Northern Ireland, Turkey, and India.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Vanda Felbab-Brown.en_US
dc.format.extent2 v. (642 p.)en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectPolitical Science.en_US
dc.titleShooting up : the impact of illicit economics on military conflicten_US
dc.title.alternativeImpact of illicit economics on military conflicten_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
dc.identifier.oclc156915524en_US


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