Resilient Knowledge-Based Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions (And Implementation in Surviving Strategies)
Author(s)Silvio Micali; Theory of Computation; Micali, Silvio; Chen, Jing
Theory of Computation
MetadataShow full item record
We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue and efficiency in truly combinatorial auctions. Notably, our mechanism guarantees its performance (1) in a very adversarial collusion model; (2) for any profile of strategies surviving the iterated elimination of dominated strategies; and (3) by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each other (in a non-Bayesian setting).Our mechanism also is computationally efficient, and preserves the players' privacy to an unusual extent.
Implementation in surviving strategies, Resilient Mechanism Design, Privacy-preserving mechanisms, Equilibrium-less mechanism design, Knowledge benchmarks