Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorParsons, John E.
dc.contributor.authorEllerman, A. Denny
dc.contributor.authorFeilhauer, Stephan M. (Stephan Marvin)
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-23T18:20:37Z
dc.date.available2009-02-23T18:20:37Z
dc.date.issued2009-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://globalchange.mit.edu/pubs/abstract.php?publication_id=992
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/44628
dc.descriptionAbstract and PDF report are also available on the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://globalchange.mit.edu/).en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we focus on one component of the cap-and-trade system: the markets that arise for trading allowances after they have been allocated or auctioned. The efficient functioning of the market is key to the success of cap-and-trade as a system. We review the performance of the EU CO2 market and the U.S. SO2 market and examine how the flexibility afforded by banking and borrowing, and the limitations on banking and borrowing, have impacted the evolution of price in both markets. While both markets have generally functioned well, certain episodes illustrate the importance of designing the rules to encourage liquidity in the market.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this work provided by the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change through a consortium of industrial sponsors and Federal grants. This research was also supported by a grant from the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherMIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Changeen
dc.relation.ispartofseries;Report no. 171
dc.titleDesigning a U.S. Market for CO2en
dc.typeTechnical Reporten
dc.identifier.citationReport no. 171en


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record