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dc.contributor.advisorRoger D. Peterson.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJackson, Colin F. (Colin Francis)en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-25T14:57:54Z
dc.date.available2010-03-25T14:57:54Z
dc.date.copyright2008en_US
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/53077
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2008.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.description.abstractTwo puzzles dominate the study of organizational learning and counterinsurgency. First, militaries often struggle to develop effective strategies to address the problem of counterinsurgency. Second, their strategic performance seldom improves over successive counterinsurgency campaigns. This study offers a theoretical explanation for these dominant patterns of learning dysfunction. It argues that a set of closely held, professional beliefs - the military operational code - and bureaucratic preferences distort the organizations' initial response, subsequent adaptation and interwar retention. The military operational code leads militaries to misunderstand counterinsurgency in a systematic and debilitating fashion; bureaucratic interests lead them to reject the most effective strategies once they have been uncovered. When militaries manage to break with this dysfunctional pattern, it because their professional judgment is constrained; high civilian participation and/or resource scarcity force often force militaries to adopt political strategies that are less congenial but more effective in restoring state authority. This study tests the theory against six empirical cases: Indochina, the Indochina-Algeria interlude, Algeria, British Palestine, Malaya, and Thailand. These cases strongly suggest that the dysfunctional learning patterns are the product of broadly shared, professional beliefs and bureaucratic interests rather than the common, alternative explanations based on experience, culture or normative and material constraints.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Colin F. Jackson.en_US
dc.format.extent2 v. (573 leaves)en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science.en_US
dc.titleDefeat in victory : organizational learning dysfunction in counterinsurgencyen_US
dc.title.alternativeOrganizational learning dysfunction in counterinsurgencyen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
dc.identifier.oclc501950391en_US


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