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Classical Bayesian mechanism design is "centralized," that is, the designer is assumed to know the distribution D from which the players' type profile has been drawn. We instead investigate a very "decentralized" Bayesian ...

We investigate mechanism design when the players do not exactly know their types, but have instead only partial information about them.

We study the problem of profit maximization in auctions of one good where the buyers' valuations are drawn from independent distributions. When these distributions are known to the seller, Myerson's optimal auction is a ...

The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about ...

We construct a Byzantine Agreement protocol that tolerates t < n/2 corruptions, is very efficient in terms of the number of rounds and the number of bits of communication, and satisfies a strong notion of robustness called ...

We relate the strategies obtained by (1) utility maximizers who use regret to refine their set of undominated strategies, and (2) regret minimizers who use weak domination to refine their sets of regret-minimizing strategies.

We provide an optimal probabilistic mechanism for maximizing social welfare in single-good auctions when each player does not know his true valuation for the good, but only a set of valuations that is guaranteed to include ...

In mechanism design, the traditional way of modeling the players' incomplete information about their opponents is "assuming a Bayesian." This assumption, however, is very strong and does not hold in many real applications. ...

The currently prevailing equilibrium-based approach to mechanism design suffers from a plurality of fundamental problems, and new conceptual frameworks are needed to solve or sufficiently alleviate them. In this paper, we ...

We put forward a new mechanism achieving a high benchmark for (both revenue and) the sum of revenue and efficiency in truly combinatorial auctions. Notably, our mechanism guarantees its performance (1) in a very adversarial ...