Now showing items 1-3 of 3
Revenue in Truly Combinatorial Auctions and Adversarial Mechanism Design
Little is known about generating revenue in UNRESTRICTED combinatorial auctions. (In particular, the VCG mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) In this paper we determine how much revenue can be guaranteed in such auctions. ...
Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions
Dominant-strategy truthfulness is traditionally considered the best possible solution concept in mechanism design, as it enables one to predict with confidence which strategies INDEPENDENT players will actually choose. ...
Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions
In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent ...