Noninterference for a practical DIFC-based operating system
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The Flume system is an implementation of decentralized information flow control (DIFC) at the operating system level. Prior work has shown Flume can be implemented as a practical extension to the Linux operating system, allowing real Web applications to achieve useful security guarantees. However, the question remains if the Flume system is actually secure. This paper compares Flume with other recent DIFC systems like Asbestos, arguing that the latter is inherently susceptible to certain wide-bandwidth covert channels, and proving their absence in Flume by means of a noninterference proof in the communicating sequential processes formalism.
Date issued
2009-08Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence LaboratoryJournal
2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Citation
Krohn, M., and E. Tromer. “Noninterference for a Practical DIFC-Based Operating System.” Security and Privacy, 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on. 2009. 61-76. © 2009Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
Version: Final published version
Other identifiers
INSPEC Accession Number: 10827639
ISBN
978-0-7695-3633-0
ISSN
1081-6011
Keywords
noninterference, covert channels, Information flow control, Communicating Sequential Processes