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dc.contributor.authorMinsky, Marvinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2004-10-04T14:39:58Z
dc.date.available2004-10-04T14:39:58Z
dc.date.issued1965-03-01en_US
dc.identifier.otherAIM-077en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/6119
dc.description.abstractThis paper attempts to explain why people become confused by questions about the relation between menal and physical events. When a question leads to confused, inconsistent answers, this may be (1) because the question is ultimately meaningless or at least unanswerable, but it may also be (2) because an adequate answer requires a powerful analytical apparatus. My view is that many important questions about relation between mind and brain are of this latter kind, and that some of the necessary technical and conceptual tools are becoming available as a result of work on he problems of making computer programs behave intelligently. In this paper we suggest a theory of why introspection does not give clear answers to these questions. The paper does not go very far toward finding technical solutions to the questions, but there is probably some value in finding at least a clear explanation of why we are confused.en_US
dc.format.extent1802318 bytes
dc.format.extent268279 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/postscript
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAIM-077en_US
dc.titleMatter, Mind and Modelsen_US


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