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Coalition formation in non-democracies

dc.contributor.authorAcemoglu, Daronen_US
dc.contributor.authorEgorov, Georgyen_US
dc.contributor.authorSonin, Konstantinen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08T21:33:56Z
dc.date.available2011-06-08T21:33:56Z
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifiercoalitionformati00acemen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63329
dc.descriptionOriginally titled Coalition formation in political gamesen_US
dc.descriptionNovember 30, 2009. Revised: Dec. 31, 2007 & Sept. 14, 2009en_US
dc.publisherCambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.relationAbstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Networken_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 06-33, 2009en_US
dc.subjectPower (Social sciences)en_US
dc.subjectCoalitionsen_US
dc.subjectMathematical modelsen_US
dc.titleCoalition formation in non-democraciesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.oclc678500407en_US
dc.identifier.aleph001759887en_US


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