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Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions

Author(s)
Hendricks, Kenneth; Pinkse, Joris; Porter, Robert H.
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Downloadempiricalimplica00hend.pdf (2.463Mb)
Other Contributors
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics
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Description
October, 1999
 
August, 1999--Added t.p
 
Date issued
1999
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63529
Publisher
Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Other identifiers
empiricalimplica00hend
Series/Report no.
Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 99-19

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  • MIT Dept. of Economics Working Papers Series

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