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Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns : theory and evidence

dc.contributor.authorGibbons, Roberten_US
dc.contributor.authorMurphy, Kevin Jamesen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-09T21:53:56Z
dc.date.available2011-06-09T21:53:56Z
dc.date.issued1990en_US
dc.identifieroptimalincentive00gibben_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63927
dc.publisherCambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 563en_US
dc.titleOptimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns : theory and evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.oclc23098253en_US
dc.identifier.aleph000499004en_US


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