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Optimal collusion with private information

dc.contributor.authorAthey, Susanen_US
dc.contributor.authorBagwell, Kyleen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-09T21:56:25Z
dc.date.available2011-06-09T21:56:25Z
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifieroptimalcollusion00atheen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63939
dc.descriptionOctober, 1999en_US
dc.descriptionFirst draft: May, 1998. This draft: September, 1999--Added t.pen_US
dc.publisherCambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 99-17en_US
dc.titleOptimal collusion with private informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.oclc45200025en_US
dc.identifier.aleph000951359en_US


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