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dc.contributor.authorAcemoglu, Daronen_US
dc.contributor.authorEgorov, Georgyen_US
dc.contributor.authorSonin, Konstantinen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-09T23:43:13Z
dc.date.available2011-06-09T23:43:13Z
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifierpoliticalselecti00acemen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64131
dc.descriptionJuly 31, 2009en_US
dc.publisherCambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.relationAbstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Networken_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 09-23en_US
dc.subjectPolitical stabilityen_US
dc.subjectPolitical corruptionen_US
dc.subjectDictatorshipen_US
dc.subjectEconometric modelsen_US
dc.titlePolitical selection and persistence of bad governmentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.oclc672334552en_US
dc.identifier.aleph001758988en_US


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