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Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games

dc.contributor.authorAcemoglu, Daronen_US
dc.contributor.authorEgorov, Georgyen_US
dc.contributor.authorSonin, Konstantinen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-27T21:41:46Z
dc.date.available2011-10-27T21:41:46Z
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifierequilibriumrefin0926acemen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66625
dc.descriptionOctober 16, 2009en_US
dc.publisherCambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economicsen_US
dc.relationAbstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Networken_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 09-26en_US
dc.subjectVotingen_US
dc.subjectPolitical scienceen_US
dc.subjectPower (Social sciences)en_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectPolitical gamesen_US
dc.subjectMathematical modelsen_US
dc.titleEquilibrium refinement in dynamic voting gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.oclc704277894en_US
dc.identifier.aleph001957141en_US


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