Rationality without representation

Abstract

This dissertation is about whether and how non-representational attitudes could play a role in our theories of rationality. In Chapter 1 ('Negation, expressivism, and intentionality') I argue that the best explanation for why two mental states are inconsistent need not presuppose that such states are representational-that they have, in the jargon, truth-conditions. I use this to provide a solution to the 'negation problem' for metaethical expressivism. In Chapter 2 ('Structuring logical space') I sketch an account of mathematical practice along non-representational lines. I show how it can do justice to the applicability of mathematics, and propose ways in which one's epistemic goals can impose substantial constraints on which mathematical theories to accept. Chapter 3 ('Good questions') provides a general account of the way in which rationality constrains changes in our hypothesis space. In particular, I show how some such changes can be better than others by placing the discussion within a general framework of rational dynamics, on which rational epistemic change involves maximizing expected epistemic utility.