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dc.contributor.advisorAnna Hardman.en_US
dc.contributor.authorShibata, Hiroshi, 1973-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-26T18:42:04Z
dc.date.available2012-04-26T18:42:04Z
dc.date.copyright2001en_US
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70347
dc.descriptionThesis (M.C.P.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 2001.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 102-104).en_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis studies about the patterns of debt accumulation of the state and local governments in the United States, particularly by focusing on how intergovernmental fiscal relations, fiscal institutions, capital market, and electoral mechanisms might potentially influence the patterns of debt accumulation of the state and local governments. I develop empirical models to show that both fiscal institutions and intergovernmental fiscal relations have significant impacts on the patterns of debt accumulation of the state and local governments. I also discuss that political accountability and well-functioning capital market are important in stabilizing the patterns of debt management of the state and local governments. From the empirical analysis of the patterns of the debt accumulation of the state and local governments, I claim that US fiscal management is unique particularly in that there are a variety of patterns on how the state governments regulate the fiscal management of themselves and that of their subnational governments. From the empirical results, I suggest a possibility that the state governments sometimes supplement the lack of capacity of local governments in borrowing when some local governments face severer resource constraints in their fiscal decisions as well as are faced with the limitations on borrowing capacities. That is how I claim that the flexibility in the intergovernmental fiscal relationships is one of the advantages of the decentralized fiscal management in the United States.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Hiroshi Shibata.en_US
dc.format.extent104 leavesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectUrban Studies and Planning.en_US
dc.titleStrength of the American decentralized fiscal managementen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeM.C.P.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc50336187en_US


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