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dc.contributor.advisorGeorge Apostolakis.en_US
dc.contributor.authorCavalieri d'Oro, Edoardoen_US
dc.contributor.otherSystem Design and Management Program.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-15T21:14:59Z
dc.date.available2012-05-15T21:14:59Z
dc.date.copyright2011en_US
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70818
dc.descriptionThesis (S.M. in System Design and Management)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, System Design and Management Program, 2011.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn order to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime it is necessary to guarantee high standards of security for the sites that use, store, produce, or reprocess special nuclear materials (SNM). The current surge of interest in nuclear energy requires resolution of concerns about the appropriateness of the current nuclear non-proliferation regulatory framework for the threats challenging nuclear energy systems (NES). This is especially true also considering that the structure of the current industry is exposed to imminent significant changes such as the introduction of small modular reactors (SMR), and the adoption of nuclear power in countries with unstable political systems. Over recent decades, countries nominally adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) violated it by building concealed facilities, by manipulating the configuration of their power plants, and by diverting material from their nuclear energy research and production sites. These events show evidence of a major paradigm shift in the area of non-proliferation, which started with the rivalry between two major opponents (each being guardian of its arsenal and technologies during the cold-war), and later reconfigured itself into the confrontation between countries hosting nuclear technologies, or networks of opponents, trying to acquire materials, knowledge and skills necessary to build a nuclear weapon. To create an appropriate response to all the above issues, and thus to strengthen back the nonproliferation regime, while confronting the shifted paradigm of nuclear proliferation, new tools and methods for evaluating the proliferation risk associated with nuclear energy systems become necessary. In this thesis, I discuss some of the fundamental traits and assumptions of the framework I developed in order to assess the proliferation risks associated with NESs. Important decisions within the proliferation domain, can be evaluated by a systematic and holistic approach. The high-level objective of the framework proposed here is to create a license process for the proliferation performance of NESs, and to provide a platform to assist the evaluations of the different alternatives than can be taken in order to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Edoardo Cavalieri d'Oro.en_US
dc.format.extent206 p.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectEngineering Systems Division.en_US
dc.subjectSystem Design and Management Program.en_US
dc.titleA unified risk-Informed framework to assess the proliferation risk and license the proliferation performance of nuclear energy systemsen_US
dc.title.alternativerisk-Informed framework to assess the proliferation performance of nuclear energy systemsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M.in System Design and Managementen_US
dc.contributor.departmentSystem Design and Management Program.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering Systems Division
dc.identifier.oclc793103875en_US


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