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dc.contributor.advisorRoger White.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGreco, Daniel (Daniel Louis)en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-13T19:02:27Z
dc.date.available2012-09-13T19:02:27Z
dc.date.copyright2012en_US
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72920
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D. )--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (p. 79-86).en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation I defend some controversial "level-bridging" principles in epistemology. In the first chapter, I defend the KK principle-the principle that if one knows that P, then one knows that one knows that P. I argue that saying plausible things about higher-order interpersonal knowledge requires rejecting some popular arguments against KK, and that many apparent counterexamples to KK can be explained away by appeal to contextualism about knowledge. In the second chapter, I take up the topic of epistemic akrasia-the state of believing some proposition P, while believing that one oughtn't believe that P. While many take for granted that epistemic akrasia is always irrational (and least implicitly endorse a level-bridging principle in the process), there are some apparently powerful arguments for holding that epistemic akrasia must sometimes be rational. I argue that once we get clearer on the descriptive/psychological question of what sort of state epistemic akrasia is, we can resolve this puzzle in favor of the intuitive view that epistemic akrasia is a species of irrationality. In the third chapter, I appeal to level-bridging principles to respond to some recent arguments to the effect that certain epistemological debates are somehow non-substantive, or merely verbal. If my argument succeeds, this constitutes a kind of indirect support for level-bridging principles-if we think that epistemological debates typically are substantive, we face some pressure to adopt level-bridging principles to explain this.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Daniel Greco.en_US
dc.format.extent86 p.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectLinguistics and Philosophy.en_US
dc.titleEpistemic levelsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc809109074en_US


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