Consistency in choice and credence
Author(s)
Hedden, Brian (Brian Robert)
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Other Contributors
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.
Advisor
Caspar Hare.
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This thesis concerns epistemic and practical rationality. That is, it is about what to believe and what to do. In Chapter 1, 1 argue that theories of practical rationality should be understood as evaluating decisions as opposed to ordinary sorts of non-mental actions. In Chapter 2, I use the machinery developed in Chapter 1 to rebut 'Money Pump' or 'Diachronic Dutch Book' arguments, which draw conclusions about rational beliefs and preferences from premises about how rational agents will behave over time. In Chapter 3, I develop a new objection to the Synchronic Dutch Book Argument, which concludes that rational agents must have probabilistic degrees of belief in order to avoid predictable exploitation in betting scenarios.
Description
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012. "September 2012." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-78).
Date issued
2012Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and PhilosophyPublisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Keywords
Linguistics and Philosophy.