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dc.contributor.advisorRonald L. Rivest.en_US
dc.contributor.authorShen, Emily (Emily Huei-Yi)en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-17T19:48:53Z
dc.date.available2013-06-17T19:48:53Z
dc.date.copyright2013en_US
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79224
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (p. 119-123).en_US
dc.description.abstractWe present new results in the areas of cryptography and voting systems. 1. Pattern matching encryption: We present new, general definitions for queryable encryption schemes - encryption schemes that allow evaluation of private queries on encrypted data without performing full decryption. We construct an efficient queryable encryption scheme supporting pattern matching queries, based on suffix trees. Storage and communication complexity are comparable to those for (unencrypted) suffix trees. The construction is based only on symmetric-key primitives, so it is practical. 2. Strategic equivalence of range voting and approval voting: We study strategic voting in the context of range voting in a formal model. We show that under general conditions, as the number of voters becomes large, strategic range-voting becomes equivalent to approval voting. We propose beta distributions as a new and interesting way to model voter's subjective information about other votes. 3. Statistical robustness of voting rules: We introduce a new notion called "statistical robustness" for voting rules: a voting rule is statistically robust if, for any profile of votes, the most likely winner of a sample of the profile is the winner of the complete profile. We show that plurality is the only interesting voting rule that is statistically robust; approval voting (perhaps surprisingly) and other common voting rules are not statistically robust.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Emily Shen.en_US
dc.format.extent123 p.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectElectrical Engineering and Computer Science.en_US
dc.titlePattern matching encryption, strategic equivalence of range voting and approval voting, and statistical robustness of voting rulesen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
dc.identifier.oclc844768375en_US


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