The role of military-industrial relations in the history of vaccine innovation

Abstract

This thesis examines the historical conditions that have contributed to high rates of vaccine innovation in the U.S. during the twentieth century. Empirical analysis of vaccine license data demonstrates that the highest rates of innovation were achieved during the 1940's. Historical analysis of this data indicates that a large percentage of these innovations were the product of World War II vaccine development programs. Participation in these programs fostered a uniquely productive culture of collaboration between military and industrial vaccine developers that persisted through the postwar era, maintaining innovation rates through the 1960's and early 1970's. By the mid-1970's, however, the historical circumstances and cultural factors that engendered and sustained military-industrial collaboration began to change, causing rates of vaccine innovation to fall and vaccine stocks to dwindle. Poor economic incentives for vaccine development are often cited as the reason for falling rates of innovation. This explanation is correct but incomplete, because, for example, economic incentives for vaccine development were poor during the 1940's and 1950's, when innovation rates were high. I demonstrate that vaccine innovation is tied to levels of military-industrial collaboration and that declining rates of innovation in recent decades are associated with the disruption of this military-industrial culture of collaboration. Finally, drawing on lessons from this history of military-industrial relations, I examine the opportunities and challenges that the new "war on terrorism" presents for efforts to improve vaccine innovation and supplies.