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dc.contributor.advisorJ. Phillip Thompson.en_US
dc.contributor.authorDeManche, Paul J. D. (Paul Joseph Drake)en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Urban Studies and Planning.en_US
dc.coverage.spatialncpn---en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-24T19:46:00Z
dc.date.available2013-09-24T19:46:00Z
dc.date.copyright2013en_US
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/81149
dc.descriptionThesis (M.C.P.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 2013.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (p. 72-75).en_US
dc.description.abstractIn a small and shrinking world there is pressure for planners and policymakers across the globe to import policy and program models that have worked in other cities and countries. Often lost in the process of transporting policies are questions about why they may have worked in their original political, economic and social context. The exploration of how and why policies are effectively implemented is every bit as important as whether the policy or program actually works. One issue of growing concern for planners is urban violence, particularly gang violence. In Latin America, a region that stands out as one of the most violent in the world, repressive police and military tactics have generally failed to solve the problem of gang violence. Recently there has been a turn toward more holistic preventative measures, which have strong support in both theory and practice. This paper explores the implementation of two gang violence prevention programs in the historic district (Casco Antiguo) of Panama City between 2004 and 2009. Specifically, it asks what explains successful implementation in these cases, and what lessons can be drawn from them. Using evidence from the cases and theories from the fields of public administration and international development, this paper argues that implementation was effective for two reasons: One, local-level government officials were given the discretion to adapt the programs to local conditions; and two, individual program "champions" pushed the programs to succeed by building trust with gang members, leveraging personal relationships across agencies and sectors, and providing companionship to program participants. Specific to Panama, these cases highlight the need to construct the political will to ensure a serious and continuous policy commitment to youth development. More broadly, the cases point to the importance of local experimentation for local problem solving, and to a more compassionate approach to addressing the problems facing youth.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Paul J. D. DeManche.en_US
dc.format.extent79 p.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectUrban Studies and Planning.en_US
dc.titleBridging the gap : boundary-less bureaucrats and gang reintegration in Panama Cityen_US
dc.title.alternativeBoundary-less bureaucrats and gang reintegration in Panama Cityen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeM.C.P.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Urban Studies and Planning
dc.identifier.oclc858401492en_US


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