Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorMichael Golay.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWithee, Jon E. (Jon Erek), 1970-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Nuclear Engineering.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-08-24T20:36:57Z
dc.date.available2005-08-24T20:36:57Z
dc.date.copyright2002en_US
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8133
dc.descriptionThesis (S.M. in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Ocean Engineering; and, (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, 2002.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 77-78).en_US
dc.description.abstractThe resurgence of interest in the use of nuclear technology for electrical power production has resulted in a desire to improve the existing licensing structure. Improving the licensing structure will result in reduced design time and cost for new reactor plants. An improved regulatory process is also necessary in order to license advanced reactors that are not light water technology. Risk based reactor licensing, which uses the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to justify most licensing questions, is a proposed replacement for the current methods. This work further develops the risk-based regulatory process by analyzing a portion of a new reactor concept. A reactor similar to the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is the design chosen for the analyses. The designers of the PBMR assert that the reactor's inherently safe design justifies the use of a non-standard containment system. This assertion can be treated as a design question to be justified using the risk-based approach. The effect of the changing the containment system is incorporated into the PRA for the PBMR. The contributions to the event and fault trees of the PBMR are determined for two casualties that affect the plants decay heat removal system. The initiating event for both of these casualties is assumed to be a beyond design basis earthquake. The first casualty is steam blanketing of the reactor vessel due to a rupture in the Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS). This casualty is shown to have little effect on the safety of the plant. The second casualty was failure of the RCCS due to operator inaction. If this casualty were to occur the reactor vessel has the possibility of failing catastrophically. The failure of the reactor vessel could result in damage to the fuel and release of radionuclides. The probability of this casualty resulting in a significant release of radionuclides is 7.5-10-11 / year. For the two casualties evaluated in this work, the use of a non-standard containment is justified.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Jon E. Withee.en_US
dc.format.extent80 leavesen_US
dc.format.extent6138748 bytes
dc.format.extent6138506 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectOcean Engineering.en_US
dc.subjectNuclear Engineering.en_US
dc.titleDeterministic casualty analysis of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor for use with risk-based safety regulationen_US
dc.title.alternativeDeterministic casualty analysis of the PBMR for use with risk-based safety regulationen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M.en_US
dc.description.degreeS.M.in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineeringen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Ocean Engineering.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Nuclear Engineering.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc51757911en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record