Minimizing harm : three problems in moral theory

Abstract

Chapter 1 (Distance and Morality): This chapter is a response toFrances Kamm's "Faminine Ethics: the Problem of Distance in Morality and Singer's Ethical Theory". I argue that Kamm fails to produce a pair of cases in which a moral difference is present that is not attributable to factors other than distance. I claim that all of Kamm's pairs of cases that purportedly show that distance per se matters in morality, and in which Kamm's moral intuitions seem plausible, can be subdivided into two categories: (1) the cases are not, contrary to first appearances, properly equalized for all non-distance factors that might reasonably be expected to play a moral role; and (2) the cases are properly equalized, but only in virtue of stipulations that are very hard to believe or even fully comprehend; thus our intuitions refuse to reflect those stipulations even if we seem to accept them. I also point out that Kamm's attempts at explaining why distance could possibly matter in morality fall far short, as she herself admits. I conclude that there is no reason for us to believe that distance matters in morality, and offer an explanation of why it might nevertheless appear to us that it does - there are numerous factors that apparently are of moral significance, and that are normally correlated with distance. In the process, I offer a fewmethodological remarks and suggestions, the importance of which, I believe, transcends this particular discussion. Chapter 2: (The Problem of Numbers): In this chapter I discuss whether or not numbers matter in morality in the way that most people think they do, i.e. in the way which is best exemplified by the claim that all other things being equal, if two non-overlapping groups of people cannot both be saved,

(cont.) we should save the numerically larger group. My goal is to defend John Taurek's criticism of the standard view of the role of numbers in morality, and to establish Taurek's position, despite its shortcomings, as a viable alternative to the standard view. After pointing out the under appreciated fact that in "Should the Numbers Count?" Taurek has two independent arguments for his conclusion, I proceed to defend both arguments from some of the more prominent objections that have been raised against them. I also discuss the role that fairness plays in the debate. Ultimately, in light of considerations derived from several of the objections that I address, it becomes clear that Taurek's first argument has to be rejected. In addition, several modifications have to be made in Taurek's overall position in order to make it consistent and plausible. However, the second argument, which focuses on the claim that interpersonal aggregates of losses or suffering carry little, if any, moral significance, and which, I argue, is a much more powerful and illuminating argument to begin with, stillremains to challenge the standard view. But Taurek's position is not without serious difficulties either - in the last section I point out and try to address several problems which should be a concern to anyone who is sympathetic to Taurek's views, including the problem of very large numbers. I do not claim to have the answers, and at best just offer a direction in which one may look for a solution. Chapter 3 (The Return of the Trolley): This chapter is about the Trolley Problem ...