Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorJoshua Cohen.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPoliczer, Pablo, 1964-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-08-23T18:32:28Z
dc.date.available2005-08-23T18:32:28Z
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8238
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2001.en_US
dc.description"June 2001."en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 163-178).en_US
dc.description.abstractCoercion is at the center of politics, yet how it is organized has remained poorly understood. This dissertation analyzes how the Chilean military regime (1973-90) organized coercion, focusing especially on two major shifts during the period of most institutional flux, from 1973-78. Available explanations for the shifts fail to account for the magnitude of organizational changes. As an alternative, this dissertation provides a typology of coercion, based on measurements of how well principals monitor agents' operations and performance. Principals can monitor from within their own organization (internal monitoring), or from information sources outside their direct control (external monitoring). Measuring levels of internal and external monitoring, using various criteria for the breadth and depth of information, yields a matrix with types that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. The four basic types are blind, bureaucratic, transparent, and hide and seek coercion. There are tradeoffs to each type of coercion, which can prompt principals to shift from one to another. In Chile, measurements of internal and external monitoring before and after each of the two major shifts, alongside counterfactual analysis and tests of the competing available explanations, reveal that the regime in each case grappled with organizing coercion as a discrete problem of governance. In 1974 the regime created a powerful secret police to better coordinate coercion through higher internal monitoring. The police resolved many organizational problems but failed to increase internal monitoring substantially.en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) Moreover, it created a series of new problems as it began to run amok. In 1977-78 it was replaced by another institution, which increased internal monitoring, a shift that also coincided with an increase in external monitoring. In each case, the regime's choices were influenced by, but not reducible to, broader political dynamics such as power struggles and efforts to institutionalize the regime. Secondary literature is used to analyze three other cases (Argentina, East Germany, and South Africa), that organized coercion differently than Chile. In all cases, the framework provided accounts for the variation in the organization of coercion.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Pablo Policzer.en_US
dc.format.extent178 leavesen_US
dc.format.extent18758991 bytes
dc.format.extent18758749 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectPolitical Science.en_US
dc.titleOrganizing coercion in authoritarian Chileen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
dc.identifier.oclc50305604en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record