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dc.contributor.advisorRichard J. Samuels.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTeo, Lin Ern Charisen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.en_US
dc.coverage.spatiala-ja---en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-02-10T13:32:33Z
dc.date.available2014-02-10T13:32:33Z
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/84713
dc.descriptionThesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2013.en_US
dc.descriptionThis electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.en_US
dc.description"September 2013." Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 99-112).en_US
dc.description.abstractThe meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi's nuclear plant was one of three disasters that rocked Japan on 11 March 2011, a day often referred to as "3.11." This nuclear accident led to increased attention to and disapproval of nuclear power among the Japanese public. However, despite widespread antinuclear sentiment, the public did not mobilize into sustained mass protests until June 2012. Using historical and contemporary comparisons, this thesis shows that Japan's 15- month delay in antinuclear mobilization was unusual. Both the 1979 Three Mile Island and the 1986 Chernobyl accidents had been quickly followed by mobilized protests. Moreover, the 3.11 Fukushima meltdown prompted mass protests in Germany almost immediately. Given these patterns, one would expect to have seen the Japanese mobilize earlier. The question that drives this thesis is: What led to Japan's 15-month delay in antinuclear power mobilization? Using social movement theory, I test to see whether low levels of grievance, limited availability of resources, or the lack of effective mobilizing structure and strategy help to explain this delay. Of the three explanations, I find the mobilization structure and strategy explanation to be best supported. Due to a history of overlooking antinuclear power issues in Japanese civil society, the early post-3.11 movement lacked longstanding true believers and activists, the two types of participants most effective at mobilizing. Furthermore, the use of social media platforms to organize the early protests may have contributed to why sustained protests were delayed. The empirical findings from this thesis allow us to examine more closely the devastation resulting from 3.11's nuclear meltdown and assess the strengths and weaknesses in Japanese civil society after the disaster. On a theoretical level, these findings may encourage us to question the relevance of grievance to mobilization, refine how resource availability is measured, and ask if the growing use of social media and other online tools should change the way we study social movement mobilization.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Lin Ern Charis Teo.en_US
dc.format.extent112 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science.en_US
dc.titleJapan's delayed antinuclear power mobilization after 3.11en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
dc.identifier.oclc868228981en_US


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