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dc.contributor.advisorDan Ariely and Yosef Sheffi.en_US
dc.contributor.authorChu, Yim Tonia, 1974-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-09-27T19:42:21Z
dc.date.available2005-09-27T19:42:21Z
dc.date.copyright2000en_US
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8986
dc.descriptionThesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Center for Transportation Studies, 2000.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 49-50).en_US
dc.description.abstractAuctions, especially Internet auctions, are claimed to be efficient pricing mechanisms, assuming rational behavior and recognition of individual fundamental values. This assumption and its implication are at the heart of the thesis work. The research includes both survey studies which utilize one of the most popular sites for Internet auctions, and experiments developed in the laboratory. Both field studies and laboratory experiments paid specific attention to the psychology of bidders with main focuses on starting prices, price comparison, competition, and auction formats. Two surveys and two field studies were conducted to collect statistics in real auctions and subjective opinions from real auction participants. One field experiment was performed on a real web site to test price sensitivity. A simulation bidding system was built in the laboratory to examine auction formats and the effect of competition. Four primary results are shown. First, game-playing attitude towards auctions generally exists among bidders. Second, bidders hold strong winning aspects and suffer either "winner's curse" or regret losing. Third, bidders are price sensitive when price comparison is available and their price preferences are affected by the original starting prices. Fourth, auction formats convey different information to bidders and influence the way bidders behave. (Keywords: Auctions, Internet auctioning, Individual fundamental values, Bidders' behavior)en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Yim Tonia Chu.en_US
dc.format.extent55 leavesen_US
dc.format.extent4868025 bytes
dc.format.extent4867787 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectCivil and Environmental Engineering.en_US
dc.titleBidding, playing, or competing? : rational and irrational determinants in Internet auctioningen_US
dc.title.alternativeRational and irrational determinants in Internet auctioningen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering Systems Division
dc.identifier.oclc47245659en_US


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