Essays on balance of payments crises

Abstract

This thesis studies four different aspects of balance of payments crises. Chapter l provides a dynamic asymmetric-information model of the timing of crises. It focuses on investors' learning process and its interaction with interest rate policy. The model shows that the presence of private information delays the onset of BOP crises, giving rise to large drops in asset prices when crises finally take place. It also shows that raising interest rates can be an effective defense against speculative attacks: the optimal policy consists of raising interest rates sharply as fundamentals become very weak. However, this policy is time inconsistent, suggesting a role for commitment devices such as currency boards or IMF pressure. Chapter 2 studies the relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and asset prices during crises. Key findings are that fundamentals can account for a significant part of the cross-sectional variance of stock returns during crises, and that credit market conditions play a crucial role during crises. Chapter 3 studies the behavior of spreads on emerging-market sovereign bonds of different maturities, focusing on the supply side of funds. Spreads on long-term bonds are shown to be too volatile to be reconciled with investors' being risk-neutral and financially unconstrained. An explanation for this volatility is proposed, based on the fact that investors holding long-term bonds are subject. to substantial price risk. A study of the expected returns and volatility of holding bonds of different maturities after drops in bond prices provides empirical support. Chapter 4 examines the degree of real exchange rate misalignment in seven Latin American countries and in the U.S. between 1960 and 1998. In all cases there is a long-run relationship among the CPI-based real exchange rate, stock of net foreign assets and relative price of nontradable goods. The results suggest that in 1998 the real exchange rate in Peru was in equilibrium, in Chile slightly undervalued, in Venezuela overvalued by about 8% and in the US overvalued by about 16%. In Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, the exchange rate was overvalued by over 20%.