MIT Libraries logoDSpace@MIT

MIT
View Item 
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • MIT Libraries
  • MIT Theses
  • Graduate Theses
  • View Item
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • MIT Libraries
  • MIT Theses
  • Graduate Theses
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Principal-agent alignment and relational incentive contracts in high-performance service operations

Author(s)
Doss, Ryan Garrett
Thumbnail
DownloadFull printable version (10.05Mb)
Other Contributors
Leaders for Global Operations Program.
Advisor
Deborah Nightingale and Georgia Perakis.
Terms of use
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the creation of a high-performance service operations organization. As organizations increasingly compete on service quality, increased attention has been given to measuring, tracking, and improving customer satisfaction. This thesis 1) provides a novel framework for service quality improvement and 2) explores concepts in game theory, relational contracts, and incentive mechanism design that impact service quality in the modern organization. The framework introduced in this thesis is comprised of four distinct steps. In the first step, service quality is quantitatively measured and drivers of service quality are determined both through qualitative methods and through statistical analysis on a customer-by- customer basis. In the second step, key drivers of service quality are addressed through process redesign and operational improvement. In the third step, the alignment of service operations incentive mechanisms with employee behavior consistent with high service quality is analyzed and considered in the context of building a high-performance service organization. Finally, the role of organizational learning and the relational contracts that may help to sustain a culture of experimentation, learning, and improvement are considered. These concepts are applied to a host organization, Atlantic Energy, by way of case study throughout this thesis; this acts to provide a concrete example of the application of these concepts and shows an example of the effectiveness of the framework when compared to traditional methods in service operations improvement.
Description
Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2014. In conjunction with the Leaders for Global Operations Program at MIT.
 
Thesis: M.B.A., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2014. In conjunction with the Leaders for Global Operations Program at MIT.
 
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
 
Includes bibliographical references (pages 126-127).
 
Date issued
2014
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/90776
Department
Leaders for Global Operations Program at MIT; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics; Sloan School of Management
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Keywords
Aeronautics and Astronautics., Sloan School of Management., Leaders for Global Operations Program.

Collections
  • Graduate Theses

Browse

All of DSpaceCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

My Account

Login

Statistics

OA StatisticsStatistics by CountryStatistics by Department
MIT Libraries
PrivacyPermissionsAccessibilityContact us
MIT
Content created by the MIT Libraries, CC BY-NC unless otherwise noted. Notify us about copyright concerns.