Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorNancy G. Leveson.en_US
dc.contributor.authorThornberry. Cameron L. (Cameron Louis)en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-08T15:30:01Z
dc.date.available2014-10-08T15:30:01Z
dc.date.copyright2014en_US
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/90801
dc.descriptionThesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2014.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 76-77).en_US
dc.description.abstractTraditional hazard analysis techniques are grounded in reliability theory and analyze the human controller-if at all-in terms of estimated or calculated probabilities of failure. Characterizing sub-optimal human performance as "human error" offers limited explanation for accidents and is inadequate in improving the safety of human control in complex, automated systems such as today's aerospace systems. In an alternate approach founded on systems and control theory, Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a hazard analysis technique that can be applied in order to derive causal factors related to human controllers within the context of the system and its design. The goal of this thesis was to extend the current human-controller analysis in STPA to benefit the investigation of more structured and detailed causal factors related to the human operator. Leveraging principles from ecological psychology and basic cognitive models, two new causal-factor categories-flawed detection and interpretation of feedback and the inappropriate affordance of action-were added to the human-controller analysis in STPA for a total of five categories. In addition, three of the five human-controller causal-factor categories were explicitly re-framed around those environmental and system properties that affect the safety of a control action-the process states. Using a proposed airspace maneuver known as In-Trail Procedure, a former STPA analysis was extended using this updated human-controller analysis. The updated analysis generated additional causal factors under a new categorical structure and led to new instances of specific unsafe control actions that could occur based on additional human factors considerations. The process, organization, and detail reflected in the resultant causal factors of this new human-controller analysis ultimately enhance STPA's analysis of the human operator and propose a new methodology structured around process states that applies equally as well to an automated controller.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Cameron L. Thornberry.en_US
dc.format.extent77 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectAeronautics and Astronautics.en_US
dc.titleExtending the human controller methodology in systems- Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
dc.identifier.oclc891583966en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record