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dc.contributor.advisorRoger D. Petersen.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLalwani, Sameer Premen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-25T17:09:45Z
dc.date.available2015-02-25T17:09:45Z
dc.date.copyright2014en_US
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/95555
dc.descriptionThesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2014.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 622-679).en_US
dc.description.abstractStates respond to rebellion differently, often shaping the intensity, duration, and outcome of the conflict as well as prospects for stability and state consolidation. Puzzling cross-national variation in counterinsurgency-sometimes brutal, sometimes minimalist-has drawn some inquiry, but sub-national variation by the same state incumbent has largely been neglected. This study develops a core-periphery theory to explain why states choose different strategies to fight rebellions based on what is at stake and who is rebelling. The theory identifies the variation in state strategy along two dimensions of effort and violence and contends the sub-national variation can best be explained by the value of the contested territory and the identity of the rebelling group. First, the contested territory's value, in economic, strategic, and ideational terms, will shape the strategy of effort the state is willing to deploy. When a rebellion, regardless of its size, threatens core territory, the state is likely to employ a strategy involving significant effort to decisively defeat the rebellion and regain control. Peripheral territory offers comparatively lower incentives resulting in minimalist containment strategies. Second, the positional status of the identity group composing the rebel base will shape the state's incentives and constraints for the strategic use of violence. Core social identity groups with high group worth and embeddedness within the state will motivate greater restraint as co-identity serves to limit state violence through affective mechanisms of empathy and trust and strategic mechanisms of vulnerability and information. Peripheral rebel groups are less likely to trigger such restraint and are therefore met with strategies of greater violence. The theory is tested with 29 cases of rebellion from India and Pakistan to leverage within-country variation with macro-structures of state capacity and institutions fairly constant. The study draws on extensive fieldwork, including over 150 interviews, as well as primary and secondary sources to examine state counterinsurgency through a medium-N analysis for each country's set of campaigns, as well as structured, focused comparisons of a select number of cases along specific dimensions of these conflicts and strategies. The two approaches provide strong support for the theory relative to competing explanations.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Sameer Prem Lalwani.en_US
dc.format.extent679 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science.en_US
dc.titleSelective leviathans : explaining state strategies of counterinsurgency and consolidationen_US
dc.title.alternativeExplaining state strategies of counterinsurgency and consolidationen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh. D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
dc.identifier.oclc903533126en_US


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