Europe divided but united : institutional integration and E.C.-U.S. trade negotiations since 1962

Abstract

The European Community (EC) has reshaped power relations in the international arena and influenced the nature of the world political economy through its role in international trade negotiations. From the inception of the EC, its constituent member states have delegated their authority to negotiate international trade agreements to the supranational level. They are obligated to first reach a common bargaining position, which is then defended at the international level by Community negotiators. How does this "single voice" obligation affect the likelihood of an international agreement, the content of the agreement, and the individual countries' chances at influencing the final agreement? More generally, what are the bargaining effects of combining negotiating forces with others? This dissertation also attempts to shed light on the "paradox of unity": why has the bargaining leverage of the EC in international trade negotiations not progressed at the same time, and with the same intensity, as the deepening of its institutional structure and the increase of its relative capabilities in the world economy over its forty years of existence? Building on the theoretical framework of "new institutionalist" analysis, this dissertation finds that three factors mostly determine the likely impact of negotiating as a single entity on international agreements: the defensive or offensive nature of the negotiating context; the internal voting rules of the negotiating bloc; and the negotiating competence delegated to supranational agents. Contrary to the political conventional wisdom about internal unity as external strength, in certain circumstances being "divided but united" could give the EC an edge in international bargaining. Case-studies of EC-US negotiations on agriculture in the Kennedy Round ( 1964-1967) and Uruguay Round (1986-1993), on public procurement (1990-1994), and on transatlantic "open skies" aviation agreements (1992-present) all confirm that, for a given set of national preferences, key institutional features of the EC' s trade policy-making process affect the process and outcomes of international trade agreements. Recent institutional change in the EC towards a return to intergovernmentalism in trade policy, however, suggests that member states may forfeit future international influence for the sake of national sovereignty.