| dc.contributor.author | Yildiz, Muhamet | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-09-17T18:06:02Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-09-17T18:06:02Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-11 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2010-10 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 01651765 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98593 | |
| dc.description.abstract | I consider a final-offer arbitration model in which the offers are submitted sequentially, the parties are allowed to accept offers, and the arbitrator maximizes Nash's social welfare function. I show that backwards induction in this three-period model leads to the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of Rubinstein's infinite-horizon alternating-offer bargaining game. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.10.020 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivatives | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | MIT Web Domain | en_US |
| dc.title | Nash meets Rubinstein in final-offer arbitration | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Yildiz, Muhamet. “Nash Meets Rubinstein in Final-Offer Arbitration.” Economics Letters 110, no. 3 (March 2011): 226–30. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics | en_US |
| dc.contributor.mitauthor | Yildiz, Muhamet | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Economics Letters | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Yildiz, Muhamet | en_US |
| dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117 | |
| mit.license | PUBLISHER_CC | en_US |
| mit.metadata.status | Complete | |
