2026-09-20T03:46:26Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1000552026-06-17T14:43:02Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
John E. Core and Joseph Weber.
Anderson, Joshua David
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
2015-12-03T18:46:12Z
2015-12-03T18:46:12Z
2015
2015
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/100055
928948494
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2015.
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 67-71).
This paper examines whether disaggregated financial statement information during the late 1920's reduced information asymmetry. After controlling for firms endogenously selecting their level of disaggregation, I find that disaggregation reduced the information asymmetry between market participants and between the firm and outside investors. Disaggregators had lower bid-ask spreads and short sellers paid lower loan fees for borrowing disaggregators' stocks. In addition, disaggregators were more likely to raise capital in the following year. These results are consistent with firms using high-quality financial reporting to reduce information asymmetry even in the absence of regulation as a bonding mechanism.
by Joshua David Anderson.
Ph.D.
71 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
Disaggregated financial statement information in an unregulated environment
Thesis
application/pdf
Publication
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