2026-09-18T18:39:59Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1006492026-06-06T00:55:55Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Ronald L. Rivest.
Pedroso, Marco Antonio L
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2016-01-04T20:02:08Z
2016-01-04T20:02:08Z
2015
2015
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/100649
933249046
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2015.
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 30-32).
This study provides a proof-of-concept of a newly designed verifiable voting system. The implementation elicits details in the communication and synchronization among servers, unavailable in the original design paper [M. O. Rabin and R. L. Rivest, "Efficient End to End Verifiable Electronic Voting Employing Split Value Representations." in Proc. EVOTE '14, Bregenz, Austria.]. The implemented system was tested on networks of virtual machines in a cluster, and its performance was evaluated based on the computational time and amount of data transferred. The preliminary results simulates elections with up to ten thousand votes. The team will conduct further work to implement the handling of server failures and the secure channels among the servers. This study demonstrates the feasibility of running large elections with more transparent voting systems, by leveraging the split-value representation and simple cryptographic primitives.
by Marco Antonio L. Pedroso.
M.Eng.
32 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
The implementation of a split-value verifiable voting system
Thesis
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<Abstract>This study provides a proof-of-concept of a newly designed verifiable voting system. The implementation elicits details in the communication and synchronization among servers, unavailable in the original design paper [M. O. Rabin and R. L. Rivest, "Efficient End to End Verifiable Electronic Voting Employing Split Value Representations." in Proc. EVOTE '14, Bregenz, Austria.]. The implemented system was tested on networks of virtual machines in a cluster, and its performance was evaluated based on the computational time and amount of data transferred. The preliminary results simulates elections with up to ten thousand votes. The team will conduct further work to implement the handling of server failures and the secure channels among the servers. This study demonstrates the feasibility of running large elections with more transparent voting systems, by leveraging the split-value representation and simple cryptographic primitives.</Abstract>
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