2026-09-19T16:53:06Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1018092026-06-17T14:42:39Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Kathleen Thelen.
Ferwerda, Jeremy
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
2016-03-25T13:37:08Z
2016-03-25T13:37:08Z
2015
2015
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/101809
941251895
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2015.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 195-210).
Over the last few decades, countries across the European Economic Area (EEA) have granted local governments considerable discretion over social policy. This project examines the consequences of these reforms. Drawing on unique data from over 28,000 European local governments, it demonstrates that decentralization has not been accompanied by declining levels of provision, as predicted by extant theories, but rather by significant expansion in the scale and scope of redistributive activity. Explaining this puzzle, the dissertation argues that local government behavior is shaped by the 'politics of proximity', which provides clear incentives for incumbents to invest in redistributive policy for electoral gain. These hypotheses are tested across five empirical chapters, each of which leverages micro-level data, natural experiments, and speech evidence to explore this emerging form of redistributive politics.
by Jeremy Ferwerda.
Ph.D.
210 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Political Science.
The politics of proximity : local redistribution in developed democracies
Thesis
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Publication
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