2026-09-20T09:23:28Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1050772022-01-13T07:54:52Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
John E. Core.
Packard, Heidi A
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
2016-10-25T19:52:49Z
2016-10-25T19:52:49Z
2016
2016
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105077
960722683
Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2016.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 77-81).
This paper analyzes the decision to disclose performance compensation targets that contain information about future profitability. I test the effect of factors expected to influence the decision to provide other expectation disclosures, e.g. management forecasts, as well as that of factors particular to the compensation setting. Results suggest that financial reporting concerns (as measured in Carter et al., 2007) along with pressure from the SEC influence performance target disclosure, and that the influence changes with the availability of management forecasts. I further test determinants of the level of performance target relative to a management forecast. I show institutional ownership is associated with higher performance targets relative to forecasts, while neither excess compensation, SEC pressure, nor financial reporting incentives appear to influence this difference.
by Heidi A. Packard.
S.M. in Management Research
81 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
Why do firms disclose performance compensation targets?
Thesis
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