2026-09-18T23:39:20Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1059862026-06-06T00:48:43Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Howard Shrobe.
Fingeret, Samuel (Samuel P.)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2016-12-22T15:17:32Z
2016-12-22T15:17:32Z
2015
2015
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105986
965787361
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2015.
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 93-97).
In this thesis, we argue that software-based defenses to code reuse attacks are fundamentally flawed. With code pointer integrity as a case study, we show that a secure and efficient software-based defense to code reuse attacks is impossible and thus motivate the case for hardware approaches. We then propose our tagged architecture system Taxi (Tagged C) as a practical defense against code reuse attacks which minimally modifies existing hardware components. We also propose strong defense policies which aim to guarantee security while minimizing tag memory usage. Our Taxi prototype, a modified RISC-V ISA simulator, demonstrates that we can defeat code reuse attacks with high compatibility and low memory overhead.
by Samuel Fingeret.
M.Eng.
97 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Defeating code reuse attacks with minimal tagged architecture
Thesis
application/pdf
false
Publication
unknown
unknown
<Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="0d6c46fd-6ef2-40d0-8930-52283d557fe6">
<Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type>
<Language>eng</Language>
<Title>Defeating code reuse attacks with minimal tagged architecture</Title>
<PublishedIn>
<Publication>
</Publication>
</PublishedIn>
<PublicationDate>2015</PublicationDate>
<Authors>
<Author>
<DisplayName>Fingeret, Samuel (Samuel P.)</DisplayName>
<Affiliation>
<OrgUnit>
</OrgUnit>
</Affiliation>
</Author>
</Authors>
<Editors>
</Editors>
<Publishers>
<Publisher>
<DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName>
<OrgUnit />
</Publisher>
</Publishers>
<License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License>
<Keyword>Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.</Keyword>
<Abstract>In this thesis, we argue that software-based defenses to code reuse attacks are fundamentally flawed. With code pointer integrity as a case study, we show that a secure and efficient software-based defense to code reuse attacks is impossible and thus motivate the case for hardware approaches. We then propose our tagged architecture system Taxi (Tagged C) as a practical defense against code reuse attacks which minimally modifies existing hardware components. We also propose strong defense policies which aim to guarantee security while minimizing tag memory usage. Our Taxi prototype, a modified RISC-V ISA simulator, demonstrates that we can defeat code reuse attacks with high compatibility and low memory overhead.</Abstract>
<Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right"
>
</Access>
</Publication>