2026-09-18T18:56:23Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1059872026-06-06T00:54:47Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Howard E. Shrobe.
González, Julián Armando
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2016-12-22T15:17:34Z
2016-12-22T15:17:34Z
2015
2015
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105987
965795675
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2015.
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 105-111).
The rise of code reuse attacks has been devastating for users of languages like C and C++ that lack memory safety. We survey existing defenses to understand why none are generally applicable, focusing our attention on the Code Pointer Integrity (CPI) defense. We show that while CPI is hard to implement securely on modern architectures, it is based on the promising idea of storing metadata on memory. We also introduce Taxi (Tagged C), a set of hardware modifications that aim to prevent code reuse attacks by storing small amounts of memory metadata known as tags in hardware. Our reference implementation prevents several classes of code reuse attacks without losing compatibility with the C memory model and provides valuable insight into how tagged architectures can be used to enforce security properties on existing code.
by Julián Armando González.
M.Eng.
111 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Taxi : defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory
Thesis
application/pdf
Publication
unknown
unknown
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