2026-09-20T09:07:03Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1066992022-01-13T07:54:05Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131024
R. Scott Kemp.
Brandt-Erichsen, Haley
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
n-us--- a-kn---
2017-01-30T18:51:11Z
2017-01-30T18:51:11Z
2016
2016
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/106699
969900120
Thesis: S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, 2016.
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 63-68).
North Korea's relationship with nuclear technology has concerned the world for decades. A wide array of negotiation methods from punitive sanctions to energy assistance have been attempted to dissuade the nation from developing its weapons program -- but every resolution has been temporary at best. We focus on the United States' negotiation strategy and attempt to uncover inconsistencies between it and the material facts of the North Korean situation. The historical record of past negotiations and rhetoric used by each party during previous attempts are considered in our analysis, in order to construct a picture of diplomatic evolution over time. We believe that the North Korean bargaining position -- which has been highly consistent across decades of cyclic negotiating behavior -- is fundamentally incompatible with US demands for complete denuclearization.
by Haley Brandt-Erichsen.
S.B.
68 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Nuclear Science and Engineering.
Negotiation strategies in American-North Korean nuclear talks, 1992-2013
Thesis
application/pdf
Publication
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