2026-09-18T20:12:50Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1075332022-01-13T07:54:08Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Teppei Yamamoto.
Andronescu, Cristina Gabriela
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
2017-03-20T19:38:45Z
2017-03-20T19:38:45Z
2016
2016
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107533
974489086
Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2016.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 35-39).
How does the expansion of social protection programs to the poor in developing democracies affect social cohesion? I address this question by examining Bolivia's central government run, non-contributory pension program, Renta Dignidad. Using a regression discontinuity design as well as a novel difference-in-discontinuities design, I find that recipients of pension benefits are overall more likely to display increased support for the central government and that in provinces where both territorial tensions and class tensions are most acute, support for the central government is significantly greater. This is consistent with a theoretical argument that expansion of social protection to the poor can mitigate opposition on active dimensions of social conflict that intersect the socio-economic dimension.
by Cristina Gabriela Andronescu.
S.M.
49 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Political Science.
Pension benefits and social cohesion
Thesis
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Publication
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